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The aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has called the export-led growth 
model of Asian economies into question. This paper describes the contribution that 
macroeconomic policy can make to promote a rebalancing of growth away from dependence 
on exports to developed economies to a more sustainable pattern of growth centered on 
domestic and regional demand. This represents a significant departure from the traditional 
uses of macroeconomic policy to stabilize the economic cycle and achieve stable and low 
inflation. The evidence suggests that macroeconomic policy can successfully contribute to 
growth rebalancing. Policy measures not only can affect aggregate demand directly, but can 
also affect it indirectly via their “microeconomic” impacts on private sector behavior. Although 
in the long-term fiscal policy should be balanced to maintain government debt stability and 
avoid crowding out of private investment, there may be substantial scope to expand 
monetary and fiscal policy in the medium-term to offset the deflationary effects of an 
appreciating currency during periods of current account reversal. Previous experience 
suggests that most of the needed stimulus can be provided by monetary policy, with only a 
supplementary role to be played by fiscal policy. Moreover, Asian economies with large 
current account surpluses tend to have sufficient fiscal space. 
The evidence suggests that excessive savings rather than insufficient investment is the main 
factor behind high current account surpluses in Asian economies. This implies that 
measures to encourage consumption, either by raising the level of household disposable 
income or reducing the savings rate are likely to have the highest payoff in terms of reducing 
imbalances. Increased spending on social protection, including health insurance, 
unemployment insurance and pensions, as well as investment in education, are seen as key 
ways to reduce household demand for precautionary savings. Governments can raise 
investment spending directly through increased government investment, especially 
infrastructure investment. There also may be large payoffs to making investments to improve 
the investment climate, thereby encouraging private investment. Cuts in corporate tax rates 
and government support for deepening of financial markets can also encourage investment, 
including improving the infrastructure for corporate bond markets, developing credit 
databases and other infrastructure for SMEs, and developing the infrastructure for 
microfinance. Cuts in export subsidies and foreign exchange intervention can cut net exports 
directly. Improvement of frameworks for macroeconomic and financial stability can also 
support domestic demand by reducing uncertainty and the need for precautionary savings. 
This includes giving more explicit weight to financial stability as an objective of monetary 
policy, developing a macroprudential framework for financial surveillance and regulation, and 
refining policy tools for management of capital flows. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although Asian economies have enjoyed high growth, rising per capita incomes and 
diminishing poverty during the period of export-led growth, the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 has called this growth model into question. First, it seems likely 
that Asia’s traditional major export markets—the United States (US)  and Europe—will 
experience a prolonged period of sluggish growth as they work off the excesses of the crisis. 
Second, policies that supported export-led growth, especially foreign exchange rate 
intervention to keep exchange rates under-valued, helped to widen global current account 
imbalances that likely contributed to global economic and financial instability that culminated 
in the crisis. Third, the export-led growth phase had undesirable side-effects, including, in 
some cases, widening income gaps and, in almost all cases, substantial environmental 
degradation, including rapid growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, Asian 
economies need to consider ways in which their growth pattern can be re-oriented away 
from export-led growth to one that is more balanced and sustainable. This means growth 
that is consistent with smaller global imbalances, more reliant on domestic and regional 
demand, and more inclusive and environmentally sustainable.  
This paper contributes to that debate by analyzing ways that macroeconomic policy can 
contribute to such growth rebalancing. This is fundamentally a departure from the traditional 
tasks of macroeconomic policy, i.e., stabilization of the economic cycle and, in the longer-
term, achievement of price stability. Moreover, the time frame of such policies is 
considerably longer than is usual in the case of macroeconomic stabilization policy. Such a 
long period means that there is less (although, we will argue, still some) scope for a 
sustained expansion of fiscal policy, since it eventually would hit constraints of fiscal 
sustainability. In other words, fiscal policy should still aim to be neutral over the cycle. 
Therefore, rather than simply contributing directly to aggregate demand, such policies should 
aim to influence the overall investment-savings balance in other ways as well. We argue 
that, in the current context, macroeconomic measures that contribute to such rebalancing 
can also contribute importantly to achieving the traditional stabilization tasks. 
This is by no means easy, since the current account balance reflects the gap between 
savings and investment, which is inherently difficult to target. This is because the 
determinants of investment and savings are many, complex, and subject to all manner of 
feedback loops. This point has been forcefully argued by McKinnon (2010) among others. 
The case of Japan is an object lesson. Although the US dollar fell by 62% against the 
Japanese yen between its peak of ¥260 in February 1985 to just ¥99 in mid-1994, 
adjustment of the current account was temporary. In fact, Japan’s current account surplus in 
the decade following the Plaza Accord of 1985 averaged 2.7% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), versus only 1.4% in the period 1980–1985. Thus, although savings fell, investment 
eventually fell even more, partly reflecting the “hollowing-out” of the economy as 
manufacturing capacity shifted offshore in search of lower production costs. 
Moreover, the notion of growth rebalancing should not be limited to ways to reduce the 
current account balance. Asian economies need to achieve higher rates of growth from 
domestic and regional demand to make up for the looming shortfall of export growth to the 
developed economies. Therefore, policies are needed to promote the growth of domestic 
and regional demand, and to facilitate the supply-side adjustments that need to accompany 
such rebalancing. Policy  measures also need to aim to promote growth that is more 
sustainable from the standpoint of inclusiveness and environmental sustainability. In view of 
these considerations, this paper examines not only broad policies for managing aggregate 
demand—taxes, spending, interest rates, and currency policy—but also policies with more 
“microeconomic” effects, such as spending on social safety nets, changes in income 
distribution, changes in tax rates, deepening of financial markets, and increasing 
macroeconomic and financial stability.  ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
recommendations for achieving rebalancing via macroeconomic policy. Section 3 reviews 
the current state of imbalances within the region. Section 4 examines the feasibility of using 
macroeconomic policy to achieve rebalancing. Section 5 describes specific measures to 
stimulate domestic demand, including consumption and investment. This includes a 
discussion of ways to promote growth that is more inclusive and environmentally 
sustainable. Section 6 examines the contribution of improving the policy frameworks for 
macroeconomic and financial stability, including management of capital flows. Section 7 
concludes. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a vast literature on the traditional macroeconomic tasks of stabilization of the 
economic cycle and achievement of price stability, but the literature on macroeconomic 
policies to encourage growth rebalancing is still quite limited. The literature on rebalancing 
typically starts from the recognition of the identity that the current account surplus equals 
savings minus investment, so that a reduction of the current account surplus needs to be 
accompanied ex post by lower savings and/or higher investment. Therefore, one can 
consider policies either that act on net exports directly, or that act on savings or investment. 
Since household savings are an important component of overall national savings, policies 
that encourage consumption (for a given level of disposable income) can also contribute to 
rebalancing growth. 
Perhaps the earliest discussion of these issues was in the Mayekawa report, issued to 
address the rise of Japan’s current account imbalance with the US in the mid-1980s 
(Mayekawa 1986). The report’s conclusions are uncannily familiar. It identified six major 
areas for policy changes to reduce current account balances: expansion of domestic 
demand, including both consumption and infrastructure investment; transformation of the 
industrial structure, including promotion of foreign direct investment; promotion of 
manufactured imports and further improvements in market access; international financial 
liberalization and stabilization of international currency values; increased contribution to the 
global economy and international cooperation; and fiscal and monetary policy support. The 
report was rather vague regarding the last, however. It proposed to continue fiscal 
consolidation, while supporting a reallocation of spending to promote private sector vitality, 
support deregulation and promote medium-term balanced growth. Regarding taxation, the 
most important proposal was to end preferential tax treatment for savings accounts. 
Regarding monetary policy, it called for currency stability, but with “flexible” operation to 
support domestic demand. 
Eichengreen (2009) identifies four major implications of the global financial crisis for 
macroeconomic policy management in Asia: the need for policy space to be kept in reserve 
for future shocks; the desirability of increased exchange rate flexibility, both to absorb 
external shocks and contribute to  adjustment of imbalances; the need to incorporate 
financial stability concerns more explicitly into monetary policy frameworks; and the 
desirability of having a regional pooling arrangement for foreign exchange reserves to 
reduce the need for individual countries to insure themselves against capital outflows by 
building up foreign exchange reserves.  
Regarding fiscal policy, the prescription for deficit countries such as the US is 
straightforward—reducing fiscal deficits can contribute to reducing the current account deficit 
as well, although the scope for and will to accomplish such reductions will be limited as long 
as the economy is below full employment (Bosworth and Collins 2010). Fiscal consolidation 
should also improve prospects for debt sustainability by achieving stability of the ratio of 
government debt to GDP, an additional incentive for deficit countries to adopt more 
contractionary fiscal policy. However, surplus countries have no similar incentive to adopt ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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more expansionary fiscal policies, as has been demonstrated by Germany’s reluctance to do 
so during the current crisis. Fiscal expansion is less attractive, because of its tendency to 
worsen both the current account balance and debt sustainability conditions.  
Prasad (2009) advocates the following to promote economic rebalancing: increasing 
spending on the social safety net and other government insurance mechanisms to help 
reduce precautionary motives for saving; developing financial markets and increasing their 
efficiency to aid smoothing of consumption and investment by companies; promoting 
financial inclusion; and increasing exchange rate flexibility to promote consumption via 
terms-of-trade effects and creation of greater monetary policy space to promote 
macroeconomic stability.  
Asian Development Bank (2009) argues that policies aiming to reduce the imbalance 
between savings and investment should focus on increasing consumption rather than 
promoting investment, since the evidence for under-investment in Asia is slight. (See Section 
3 for a more detailed discussion of this.) It argues in addition that fiscal policy can make a 
substantial contribution toward making domestic demand more robust in both the short run 
and long run. Consumption can be promoted by both raising the share of household income 
in total income, and by reducing the incentive for precautionary saving. Regarding the 
former, ADB (2009) advocates that governments in the region encourage increased dividend 
payments to stockholders, and implement income transfer schemes to support low-income 
groups. For the latter, ADB (2009) also advocates increased spending on social protection 
and social safety nets, including greater state provision of health care, education, and 
pension benefits. 
Lee (2010) argues that countries such as the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC) 
should encourage firms to increase dividends to strengthen the link between corporate 
profits, household income and consumption. He also advocates increased government 
expenditure on health, social safety nets, education and housing to reduce households’ 
precautionary motive for saving. He advocates measures to increase the investment climate 
in countries where this is lagging. Export subsidies and other price distortions that favor 
exporters should also be eliminated. He also calls for further cooperation at the regional 
level, such as: strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) agreement, 
including the setting up of an Independent Surveillance Unit (now known as the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO)); establishing an Asian Financial Stability 
Dialogue to foster economic and financial coordination; and promoting measures to support 
increased regional infrastructure investment. 
Bery (2010) highlights the need for expenditure switching in the case of India to encourage 
the supply of key non-tradables, including infrastructure provision in both the public and 
private sectors, as well as measures to enhance human capital, such as better public 
education and public health. Even though India does not need rebalancing at the 
macroeconomic level in terms of the current account balance, these measures can still help 
achieve higher and more sustainable economic growth. 
In its review of the experience of countries that transitioned out of large current account 
surpluses, IMF (2010) finds that monetary and fiscal policy stimulus measures played an 
important role in offsetting the impacts of exchange rate appreciation. In fact, in a number of 
cases, policy stimulus overshot what was needed, as the deflationary effects of currency 
appreciation were over-estimated, and stimulus had to be withdrawn due to the development 
of inflationary pressures and asset bubbles. On the plus side, the IMF study found that 
surplus countries typically had ample policy space at the beginning of such episodes that 
enabled them to implement stimulus measures. This study is cited in more detail in section 
4. 
Regarding household savings, Jha, Prasad and Terada-Hagiwara (2009) conclude that the 
two main areas for policy to have an impact on reducing precautionary savings are: 
expanding the social safety net, especially health insurance coverage; and financial ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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development in order to enable households to insure against idiosyncratic risks to household 
income and to smooth out lifetime consumption by increasing the capacity to purchase 
durable goods and housing. 
Takagi (2009) argues against using fiscal policy permanently as a way to rebalance growth, 
from the standpoint of concerns about both debt sustainability and the tendency of higher 
fiscal spending to raise interest rates and thereby crowd out productive private investment. 
Of course, presumably the latter would be less of a concern if the economy was operating at 
less than full capacity, which would likely be the case if currency appreciation exerted a 
deflationary impact on the economy. 
To summarize, many authors support expansion of the social safety net, expanded access 
to financial services and income transfers as ways to reduce demand for precautionary 
savings and raise household disposable income. Regarding net exports, many authors 
conclude that greater exchange rate flexibility can allow needed adjustments, while 
establishment of a regional or global financial safety net can reduce the need for 
precautionary government saving via increase of foreign exchange reserves that tend to 
depress national currencies and widen global imbalances. Finally, measures to enhance 
macroeconomic and financial stability can also raise governments’ tolerance for exchange 
rate flexibility. 
3.  CURRENT STATE OF IMBALANCES IN ASIA 
A discussion of macroeconomic policy measures to reduce current account imbalances 
needs to focus on the areas where those imbalances occur. Figure 1 shows the level of 
current account balances of major Asian economies in 2008 and 2009 as a percentage of 
GDP. Of these economies, the PRC;  Hong Kong,  China; Malaysia;  Singapore;  and 
Taipei,China had current account balances of 5% of GDP or more in both 2008 and 2009. 
Among these, a recent ADB report identifies only Hong Kong, China;  Singapore;  and 
Taipei,China as having large current account surpluses as an “intrinsic structural 
characteristic” (ADB 2009: 59). However, the surpluses of the PRC and Malaysia have been 
sufficiently large and stable in recent years (averages in 2005–2009 of 6.6% and 16.9% of 
GDP, respectively) that they should be included in this group as well. 
Figure 1: Current Account Balances 
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The next step is to identify the relative contribution of savings and investment to these large 
imbalances. Figure 2 shows the levels of savings and investment for major Asian economies 
in 2008, arranged from left to right in order of the size of the ratio of the current account 
surplus to GDP. Malaysia, Singapore, the PRC, and India stand out has having exceptionally 
high savings levels. Investment rates are particularly high in the PRC, India, and Viet Nam. 
Figure 2: Savings and investment levels 
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Source: ADB Statistical Database System (https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp) (accessed 15 July 2010). 
However, fundamental factors such as demographics, income levels, and economic growth 
rates can significantly influence the levels of saving and investment. Therefore, to determine 
whether or not savings rates are “high” or “excessive,” or whether investment rates are “low,” 
it is necessary to adjust for these fundamental factors to put them on a comparable basis. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the factors driving the current state of 
imbalances in Asia can be found in ADB (2009). The study attempts to identify which Asian 
economies have either excessive savings, insufficient investment or both. The methodology 
is to regress investment and savings rates for a large sample of countries against standard 
explanatory variables such as income levels, demographic factors, and measures of 
financial development, and then to identify which countries are outliers relative to the 
predicted values generated from such regressions.  
The study finds that investment rates are actually excessively high in the PRC and 
Singapore, but that none in Asia are excessively low (ADB 2009: 76). Instead, the study 
finds that the economies most affected by the Asian crisis of 1997–1998—Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea  (hereafter Korea), Malaysia, Philippines,  and Thailand—showed more 
evidence of over-investment during the pre-crisis periods. If anything, investment in these 
countries simply appears to have returned to more normal levels rather than being too low.  
Nonetheless, there is evidence that some Asian countries’ investment levels are inadequate. 
For example, a recent ADB study (ADB 2008) finds that the investment climates of the PRC, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand,  and Viet Nam still lag well behind those of the newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) and advanced countries (see Figure 3). This suggests that 
there is probably scope to expand investment in these countries by implementing reforms to 




Figure 3: Business Climate Indices in Asian and Benchmark Economies 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2007). 
Regarding savings rates, the study finds relatively strong evidence that savings rates are 
excessively high in the PRC, Singapore,  and Thailand (ADB 2009). It also finds some 
evidence of over-saving in the countries affected by the Asian crisis—Indonesia, Korea, and 
the Philippines. The report acknowledges that, in the latter countries, this may partly reflect a 
shock effect from the Asian crisis, which could be expected to wear off over time. Overall, 
the report concludes that high levels of savings, not insufficient investment, are the main 
factor contributing to high current account surpluses in some Asian countries. This suggests 
that policies aimed at supporting consumption have the greatest potential to lower 
imbalances, as long as they do not come at the expense of investment (ADB 2009). The 
only exceptions to the latter caveat are the PRC and Singapore, where, as mentioned 
above, the study finds evidence of excessive investment as well. Interestingly, although 
Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China have very high current account surpluses (averages of 
11.6% and 7.5% of GDP, respectively, in 2005–2009), they do not show up in the study as 
having either excessively high savings or insufficient investment.  
There is also evidence of a connection between high current account surpluses and large 
increases in the level of foreign exchange reserves that have been accumulated. Figure 4 
shows the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP for major Asian economies. Due to its 
currency peg system, Hong Kong, China has the highest relative level of foreign exchange 
reserves, followed closely by Singapore and Taipei,China. The next tier of countries—PRC, 
Malaysia and Thailand—have ratios of about 50% of GDP. This suggests that large-scale 
foreign exchange rate intervention helped to depress foreign exchange rates, thereby 
contributing to a high level of net exports. Regardless of whether such foreign exchange ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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accumulation is practiced for reasons of self-insurance or mercantilism
1
Figure 4: Asian Foreign Exchange Reserve Levels, End-2009 
, it still tends to lead 
























Source: CEIC Data (ceicdata.com) (accessed 15 July 2009). 
The next step is to drill down to the next level to determine which sectors—household, 
corporate or government—contribute most to excessive savings in particular countries where 
excessive saving has been identified. Some of the most detailed work in this regard has 
been done on the PRC. 
PRC 
The PRC’s current account surplus is not the largest in Asia as a percentage of GDP, but is 
the largest in absolute size, and hence the largest contributor to global imbalances. Figure 5 
shows the composition of savings in the PRC. The national savings rate rose steadily by 
14.5 percentage points between 2000 and 2007, hitting over 50% of GDP by the end of the 
period. The largest increase came from the government sector (7.6 percentage points), 
followed by the household sector (4.7 percentage points),  and the corporate sector (2.3 
percentage points). 
                                                 
1 Aizenman and Lee (2005) find evidence to support self-insurance as the main explanation of reserve 
accumulation. However, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2009) find that “fear of appreciation” is correlated with 
higher economic growth rates. ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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Figure 5: Composition of Savings in PRC 
 
Source: CEIC Data (ceicdata.com) (accessed 6 February 2009). 
The most striking fact about the PRC is the low share of disposable household income in 
total disposable income, which is estimated to have fallen from 68.4% in 1998 to only 57.6% 
in 2008 (Ma and Yi 2010). Since the household savings rate rose during this period, Figure 6 
shows that the share of personal consumption spending in GDP fell even further, to only 
36.1% in 2008. This makes it a major outlier among Asian (and all) economies, and is surely 
one of the key factors contributing to the high overall savings rate of the PRC. Moreover, a 
number of studies find that the household savings rate in the PRC is significantly elevated 
due to precautionary savings for health, unemployment retirement and education, including 
Chamon and Prasad (2008), Horioka and Wan (2007) and Feng et al. (2009). This suggests 
that consumption spending in the PRC can potentially be boosted substantially by policies 
that either redistribute income toward the household sector or reduce the savings rate. 
Figure 6: Share of Household Consumption and Fixed Investment in GDP in PRC 
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The corporate savings rate in the PRC is also quite high, supported by high levels of 
profitability. Corporate profitability has been boosted by a number of factors, including 
declining employment in the state sector, price controls on land, energy and other inputs, low 
interest rates, rapid growth, and underfunded pension funds (ADB 2009, Huang and Tao 
2010). Moreover, until recently, state-owned corporations were not required to pay 
dividends, which further boosted their cash flow. Recent reforms have introduced dividend 
payouts, but levels are still low. Even when dividends are paid out, Lin (2009) argues that 
they go disproportionately to the rich, who have higher saving propensities than the poor, 
adding instead to household savings. Prasad (2009) argues that the low level of interest 
rates paid by the corporate sector reflects financial “repression”, and is an aspect of financial 
under-development. 
4.  FEASIBILITY OF USING MACROECONOMIC POLICY TO 
ACHIEVE REBALANCING 
Before discussing policy measures to influence net exports and domestic demand, it is first 
necessary to assess whether or not such interventions are feasible. The issue of feasibility 
has two aspects: (i) have such policies been successful in the past; and (ii) is there sufficient 
fiscal space in Asian economies to accomplish this? This section examines, from both 
aspects, the feasibility of using macroeconomic policy, including both fiscal and monetary 
policy, to support higher levels and growth of domestic demand to offset a decline in next 
exports arising from an appreciating foreign exchange rate.  
Effectiveness of macroeconomic policies to help rebalance growth 
As mentioned above, in the long term, fiscal policy normally should be balanced over the 
cycle because of concerns about both debt sustainability and crowding out of productive 
private investment. However, if a surplus country begins a rebalancing process that includes 
substantial appreciation of the currency, there may be an argument for medium-term easing 
of fiscal and monetary policy to cushion the deflationary effects of such appreciation 
stemming from a deterioration of net exports.  
IMF (2010) presents the most comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of such 
rebalancing policies. The study analyzed 28 episodes of current account surplus reversals 
that were accompanied by currency appreciation and macroeconomic stimulus, either 
monetary or fiscal. The findings were largely positive, including the following: 
  The current account surplus narrowed on average by 5.1 percentage points of GDP 
relative to the pre-adjustment period; 
  There was no significant difference in the average GDP growth rate after the reversal 
compared with the pre-adjustment period (although the variance was large); 
  The contribution to growth of domestic demand rose and that of net exports fell; 
  Savings fell and investment rose; 
  Imports rose while exports were stable; 
  There was no evidence of an increased tendency of the currency to overshoot; and 
  The amount of needed macroeconomic policy stimulus was frequently over-estimated, 
leading to policy reversals IMF (2010). 
In the five cases examined in detail (Germany in 1970, Japan in 1973 and 1988, Korea in 
1989, and Taipei,China in 1988), Table 1 shows that monetary and fiscal policy was eased 
in only two episodes, those in Japan (IMF 2010). In the case of the fiscal tightening episodes 
in Japan, policy had to be tightened later as the economy overheated. The general 
conclusion is that the extent of deflationary impact from currency appreciation was frequently ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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over-estimated, and that the required easing of fiscal and monetary policy to offset such 
appreciation was therefore more moderate than first believed by the authorities. This 
suggests that, in future episodes of rebalancing, most of the load can be borne by monetary 
policy, and the need for sustained fiscal stimulus may be modest. This is important, because 
monetary policy is both easier to implement and easier to reverse than fiscal policy, and has 
fewer long-term consequences. Again, the key lesson appears to be the need to monitor 
such easing closely to make sure that it does not become excessive, leading to inflation 
and/or asset bubbles. These results support the case for macroeconomic policy making an 
effective contribution to growth rebalancing. 
Table 1: Case Studies: Policies Used During Current Account Surplus Reversals 
    Germany 1970  Japan 1973  Japan 1988  Korea 1989  Taipei,China 1988 
Fiscal policy  Neutral in 1968-69;  Expansionary in 1971–  Stimulative after 1986  Tight fiscal policy in  Fiscal consolidation 
  shift to tightening  72 in expectation of  as economy began  1987 to counter   
  in 1971–72 as  weakening external  to slow following  overheating   
  excess demand  demand  appreciation     
  pressures continued         
                 
Monetary policy  Neutral in 1968-69;  Expansionary in 1971–  Easing beginning  Tight monetary policy  Neutral monetary 
  shift to tightening  72 in expectation  in 1986 as  in 1987 to counter  policy, without 
  in 1971–72 as  of weakening  economy began  overheating; easing  regard for surpluses 
  excess demand  external demand;  to slow following  in 1989 after  and/or appreciation 
  pressures continued  shift to tightening  appreciation;  slowdown and stock   
    in 1973 as inflation  sterilization of  market collapse;   
    accelerated;  capital inflows  tightening after   
    sterilization of    growth rebounded   
    capital inflows    in 1990–91;   
        sterilization of   
            capital inflows    
Source: IMF (2010). 
Next, it is necessary to assess the amount of fiscal space that Asian economies can draw on 
to support macroeconomic adjustment policies. Horton (2010) argues that most Asian 
economies have a fair amount of fiscal space. For example, Figure 7 shows the comparison 
of the output gap with various measures of fiscal sustainability, including the fiscal deficit as 
a percentage of GDP, public debt as a percentage of GDP, and inflation and the current 
account as a percentage of GDP. The green line represents a moderate fiscal constraint and 
red line indicates a severe fiscal constraint. In terms of the fiscal deficit ratio, only Japan and 
India look constrained. The public debt to GDP ratios of the Philippines and Singapore are 
high as well, but, of course, Singapore also has high asset levels. Among Asian economies, 
only Viet Nam has a problematic level of the current account surplus. In any case, India, the 




Figure 7: Selected Fiscal Constraints in Asia 
Average Output Gap and Credibility Constraints
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Average Output Gap and Macroeconomic Constraints






































































Notes: Green line represents moderate fiscal constraint and red line indicates severe fiscal constraint. 
PRC=People’s Republic of China; HKG=Hong Kong, China; IND=India; IDN=Indonesia; KOR=Republic of Korea; 
JPN=Japan; MAL=Malaysia; PHL=Philippines; SGP=Singapore; TAP=Taipei,China; THA=Thailand, VNM=Viet Nam. 
Source: Horton (2010: 592). 
Adams, Ferrarini and Park (2010) assess the amount of policy space currently available in 
developing Asia by analyzing the degree of fiscal sustainability in those economies using 
various methodologies. Their work points to a high level of fiscal space in most developing 
Asian economies going into the global financial crisis. In view of the large amount of fiscal 
stimulus implemented by many economies during the crisis, they suggest that, to stabilize 
debt-to-GDP ratios in the near term, Asian developing economies need to begin at least a 
modest program of fiscal retrenchment beginning in 2011. However, given the large degree 
of fiscal stimulus that was implemented in 2008 and 2009, this could still be consistent with a 
relatively expansionary stance going forward. Therefore, there should still be scope for fiscal 
policy to aid in structural adjustment. 
In examining the impacts of fiscal policy on growth, one must also keep in mind the potential 
reactions of the private sector. In the extreme case, the theory of Ricardian equivalence 
predicts that increases in government debt will prompt an equal and opposite increase in 
private savings, as households anticipate the need to pay higher taxes later to pay off the 
debt. However, there is not much empirical evidence for Ricardian equivalence, so it remains 
mainly a textbook bugbear (see, e.g., Bernheim (1987)). Moreover, it runs up against the 
observation that government debt is rarely actually paid off. More usually, it is offset by 
higher levels of nominal GDP, which is the main factor that tends to stabilize the ratio of 
government debt to GDP once the fiscal emergency that prompted the debt increases is 
past.  
The results of this section support the case for macroeconomic policy to be able to support 
growth rebalancing. First, previous episodes of current account surplus reversal 
accompanied by currency appreciation and offsetting macroeconomic policies generally 
produced major adjustments in the current account, domestic demand, savings and 
investment with little or no loss of growth. Moreover, the needed policy intervention 
frequently was less than originally estimated, suggesting that much of the burden can be 
borne by monetary policy alone. Finally, even if fiscal policy is needed, Asian economies 
with large current account surpluses appear to have adequate fiscal space to implement 
such interventions. ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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5.  POLICIES TO STIMULATE DOMESTIC DEMAND AND 
NET EXPORTS 
This section identifies in more detail macroeconomic policies that can stimulate domestic 
consumption and investment, or contribute to a reduction in net exports. The focus is mainly 
on fiscal policy measures. Monetary easing could be expected to stimulate both 
consumption and investment, but there is little more to say about the specific impacts of 
such easing. 
Consumption 
Given that the evidence in Asia points more to excessive savings rather than insufficient 
investment, it seems likely that measures to encourage consumption have the most promise. 
As mentioned above, consumer spending can be raised either by measures to increase 
household disposable income, such as transfers or tax cuts, or by measures to encourage a 
reduction in the savings rate, chiefly by reducing the incentive for precautionary savings. 
Measures that reduce the uncertainty surrounding income or large unforeseen expenditures 
related to job security, illness or other shocks may be particularly effective in persuading 
consumers to reduce their precautionary savings.  
Expansion of social safety net:  Many have argued that expanding the social safety net, 
including health insurance, unemployment insurance and pension coverage, as well as 
increasing public support for education, looks like one of the most promising avenues to 
support household consumption. Many Asian economies lag in the provision of social 
insurance, which has been linked in numerous studies to elevated levels of precautionary 
savings in those economies. For example, Wang (2009) finds that urban households in the 
PRC without social security coverage have higher savings rates than those with such 
coverage, and that higher levels of social security coverage contribute significantly to higher 
consumption levels. A McKinsey Global Institute (MGI 2009) survey of consumer spending in 
the PRC supports this result. In the survey, the cost of education was reported as the 
biggest factor in consumers’ decision to save. Other highly ranked considerations for saving 
were: the risk of illness; the expenses of caring for elderly parents; the need for investments, 
such as for home or business purchases; and the need for money during retirement and 
times of unexpected unemployment. Four of the major reasons cited in the MGI survey were 
related to social protection or to providing a safety net—illness, old-age, retirement, and 
unemployment risk.  
Figure 8 shows the ranking of Asian economies in terms of the Asian Development Bank’s 
social protection index. Aside from Japan, Korea, and some Central Asian economies, most 
Asian economies have relatively low levels of social protection. Strikingly, the level of social 
protection is only loosely associated with per capita income levels. The high levels of social 
protection in some countries with low incomes, including some of the Central Asian 
republics, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam, shows that low income levels are not a barrier to such 
protection levels. This suggests that it should be feasible for higher-income countries, such 
as the PRC and those in ASEAN, to significantly raise levels of social protection.  ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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Note: PRC= People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Baulch, Weber and Wood (2008). 
Figure 9 shows social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Asia. These largely 
parallel the results for the social protection index in Figure 8 above. The share for the PRC is 
4.6%, only a little over one-quarter of the level for Japan, while ratios are somewhat lower in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, and much lower in the Philippines. This re-emphasizes the point 
that there is plenty of room to raise social protection expenditures in a number of middle-
income countries in Asia.  
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A recent study (Baldacci, et al 2010) estimates that social expenditure reforms in the PRC 
would have both an “income effect” and an “insurance effect” on current consumption. The 
income effect reflects the increase in lifetime resources arising from transfers of education 
and health, while the insurance effect reflects the decrease in precautionary savings. Table 2 
shows the impacts of an increase of expenditure of one percent of GDP in each category on 
household consumption. Pension expenditures have the largest impacts and education the 
smallest. Also, pension impacts are relatively larger for urban than rural households. 
However, the actual impact on consumption is greater in rural regions, because of lower 
income levels and higher propensities to consume there (Baldacci, et al. 2010). Overall, 
these estimates imply that a 3% of GDP increase in social sector spending would increase 
consumption in the PRC by US$115 billion, which is approximately 1% of the $10 trillion 
consumption expenditures in the US. 
Table 2: Income Impact of Expenditure Reforms on Household Consumption 
(% of GDP) 
Expenditure 
Reform 
Pension  Health  Education 
Simulation       
Total  1.42  0.77  0.51 
Urban  0.92  0.46  0.24 
Rural  0.50  0.32  0.27 
Budget Shares       
Urban  0.75  0.69  0.58 
Rural  0.25  0.31  0.42 
Note: Simulations assume a 1% of GDP increase in each expenditure category annually.   
Source: Baldacci, et al (2010). 
In Taipei,China, introduction of the National Health Insurance scheme in 1995 is estimated 
to have reduced household saving rates significantly, with declines of 9–14% in the average 
level of saving (Chou et al. 2003, 2006). Athukorala and Tsai (2003) also concluded that 
increased availability of social security provisions and enhanced credit availability 
contributed to reducing household saving. Nonetheless, household savings are still relatively 
high, suggesting that other factors are at work. 
Of course, these results make the optimistic assumption that the increase in such spending 
would be “free”, resulting from a reduction of the fiscal surplus rather than an increase in 
taxation. To the extent that taxes and/or social security contributions are raised to cover 
such spending, the net impact will be less. However, if such revenues can be raised 
primarily from the corporate sector, where savings rates are excessively high, this could 
minimize the drag effect on the economy from such increases. 
Taxes and transfers:  The other major way to encourage household consumption is by 
expanding household income. This either involves permanent cuts in income  or other 
taxation, or else transfers from other sectors, most likely the corporate sector. In view of 
fiscal constraints, countries are likely to eschew permanent tax cuts, but transfers from the 
corporate sector are a possible avenue in cases where dividend payouts are low. This is 
certainly the case for the PRC, where dividend payouts of state-owned enterprises are quite 
low. Since the state is the major shareholder of these companies, it could raise revenues by 
increasing dividend payout ratios for those companies, and then distribute them to the 
household sector.  
How should such transfer programs be implemented to maximize the impact on 
consumption? Targeting lower-income households is generally preferred, as they are most 
likely to be credit-constrained and also tend to have higher propensities to consume. Cash 
transfer programs (whether conditional or unconditional) are one of the most effective ways 
to support the purchasing power of vulnerable populations. The overall effectiveness of 
these schemes depends largely on their ability to reach poor people. One increasingly ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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popular social assistance tool is the conditional cash transfer (CCT), which is a grant 
provided only if the targeted recipient carries out a specified action, such as enrolling 
children into public schools, going to the doctor for check-ups, or getting vaccinations.  
Another example of social assistance is the social pension, generally defined as state-
provided, non-contributory regular cash transfers to older citizens, given at specific ages in 
different countries. Social pensions help to reduce the poverty of older people and their 
dependents, while increasing older people’s status, material security, and access to 
services. Few countries in the region maintain social pensions to provide safety-net 
retirement incomes for people who are not members of formal schemes (HelpAge 
International 2006). 
These redistributive measures, if correctly targeted, would also contribute to promoting 
economic inclusiveness. Not only would they increase the incomes of the poorest, they 
would also increase economic opportunity by providing greater stability of income and 
insurance against shocks. Microfinance, which is discussed in the next section, would also 
increase the capacity of households to invest in durable goods, including housing, further 
widening their opportunities to participate in the economy. 
Investment 
Infrastructure investment: The government can encourage investment spending either by 
spending more directly, or by taking steps to improve the investment climate to induce 
private firms to invest more. There may well be scope to expand socially useful investment, 
particular infrastructure investment. ADB/ADBI (2008) estimates that Asia’s infrastructure 
needs through 2020 total a massive $US 8 trillion. Improving connectivity, by reducing 
transport costs, can increase the size of the effective final demand market in Asia, increasing 
its potential to act as a growth engine for the region. This is particularly important in view of 
the rapid rise of Asia’s middle class as a source of consumption demand.
2
Government policies can also encourage private investment in sectors related to green 
growth, including environmental protection, energy conservation and climate change 
prevention and mediation. The fiscal stimulus program of Korea during the global financial 
crisis provides an important example of this. Such measures also include both elimination of 
existing subsidies that encourage excessive consumption of energy and other resources, 
and introduction of Pigovian-type taxes to internalize externalities into corporate decision-
making. 
 
Improvement of investment climate:  In addition, there is significant potential to invest in 
improving the investment climate to encourage private investment. Schou-Zibell and Madhur 
(2010) provide a comprehensive assessment of investment climates in six developing Asian 
countries (PRC, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam) in comparison 
with five benchmark economies—Hong Kong, China; Japan, the Republic of Korea 
(hereafter Korea), Singapore and the US. They find that investment climates in all of these 
countries except Malaysia still lag considerably behind those of the benchmark countries. 
Although  some measures to improve climate do not necessarily require significant 
expenditure, e.g., improvements in governance, investor protection, legal rights, taxation and 
regulation, others do, including improving infrastructure, investment in education and training 
to raise skill levels, enforcement of legal protections, and improvement of financial market 
infrastructure. 
Schou-Zibell and Madhur (2010) find that the quality of infrastructure in the PRC, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam lags considerably behind the level of the benchmark 
countries. Aside from physical infrastructure, they note that other aspects of cross-border 
infrastructure investment, including soft investment, can also play a key role to improve the 
investment climate for traded goods. As one example, they find that efficient customs 
                                                 
2 Recent developments in the growth of Asia’s middle class are described in ADB (2010). ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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processing, including an electronic data interchange system, can have numerous benefits. 
Such electronic transmission of documents not only speeds up the clearance of goods, but 
can also reduce opportunities for soliciting bribes.  
Corporate tax policy: High levels of corporate taxation and onerous payment methods can 
also discourage investment. A number of Asian countries have taken steps to lower 
corporate tax rates and simplify payment methods, including the PRC, Malaysia,  and 
Thailand, but more can be done in this area. For example, the PRC reduced its Enterprise 
Income tax to equalize tax rates between foreign invested enterprises (“FIEs”) and domestic 
enterprises. Nevertheless, the total tax rate as a percentage of profit, remains high at nearly 
80% (Schou-Zibell and Madhur 2010). Next highest are Japan and the Philippines, at about 
55% of total profits. 
Deepening financial markets: Deepening of financial markets can also play an important role 
in facilitating investment, both domestically and within the region. In particular, regional bond 
markets, especially markets for corporate bonds, lag well behind developed world 
benchmarks in terms of market value relative to GDP (see Table 3). This reflects a number 
of factors, including the regulatory environment, withholding taxes, lack of infrastructure for 
interest rate and currency swaps, lack of legal protection for investors, and lack of coverage 
by credit rating agencies (see Mayes, Morgan and Lim forthcoming).  
Table 3: Sources of Private Sector Funding as % of GDP 








capitalization  Total 
   1996  2008  1996  2008  1996  2008  1996  2008 
PRC  77.2  101.6  8.7  104.2  2.7  15.5  88.7  221.4 
Hong Kong, China   146.7  138.7  236.9  378.7  11.9  14.4  395.5  531.8 
India  21.7  46.7  32.1  100.1  1.1  3.3  54.8  150.1 
Indonesia  50.5  23.2  34.7  30.2  1.6  1.6  86.9  54.9 
Japan  179.7  99.9  72.8  78.0  45.6  37.1  298.2  215.0 
Korea  49.2  100.6  28.7  85.4  38.0  60.0  115.9  246.1 
Malaysia  123.6  96.0  262.7  115.5  35.4  41.5  421.7  253.1 
Philippines  41.0  21.2  84.3  45.7  0.2  0.9  125.4  57.2 
Singapore  90.9  97.3  161.1  146.4  10.6  14.5  262.5  258.2 
Taipei,China  121.0  127.7  79.9  141.3  22.4  22.2  223.3  291.2 
Thailand  137.1  89.7  66.3  54.6  8.0  16.3  211.3  160.7 
Viet Nam  17.1  81.4  —   16.1  —  —  17.1  97.5 
Notes: GDP= Gross Domestic Product; PRC= People’s Republic of China; —= data not available. 
Source: CEIC database (http://www.ceicdata.com) (accessed 12 April 2010). 
Government expenditures can be used to encourage financial market deepening, for 
example, by taking steps to encourage the development of needed financial infrastructure, 
including the markets for interest rate and currency swaps. Improvement of tax treatment, 
especially withholding tax on foreign investors, can also play a significant role. Improved 
government debt management to provide a reliable yield curve with well-traded issues could 
provide significant payoffs with minimal cost to the Treasury. All of these measures would 
significantly increase the attractiveness of bond markets to foreign as well as domestic 
investors, thereby reducing borrowing costs. 
SMEs continue to play a key role in economic development, due to their large share of total 
employment and their role in promoting innovation, but typically they have difficulty in 
obtaining finance because of a lack of credit information and collateral available for 
borrowing purposes. Regarding the latter, steps to improve the financial data infrastructure 
such as credit databases can play an important role in improving the ability of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain credit, particularly if they co-exist with effective ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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collateral laws. Development of funded pension plans as part of deepening social protection 
could have the beneficial side-effect of deepening the domestic investor base, thereby 
expanding the market for domestic credit. Establishing an institutional framework for 
microfinance can enhance the ability of households and small firms to finance investment 
and smooth volatility incomes.  
Net exports 
Expansion of fiscal policy can directly affect net exports as well. First, increased government 
or private expenditure is likely to lead to an increase in imports. Second, to the extent that 
stronger domestic demand tends to raise interest rates and lead to currency appreciation, 
net exports can further be reduced. If export promotion policies have been carried out in a 
significant way, then ending them would produce some net benefits to the fiscal balance as 
well as contributing to a reduction of net exports. Reduced foreign exchange rate 
intervention would lessen the amount of foreign exchange financing bonds to needed to be 
issued, while ending export subsidies and other price distortions would also reduce fiscal 
costs.  
6.  WAYS TO INCREASE MACROECONOMIC AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
Improved macroeconomic and financial stability can also potentially contribute to rebalancing 
by reducing the need for precautionary saving, both for households and for corporations, and 
by improving the investment climate. This has three broad aspects. First, monetary policy 
needs to take into account financial stability more explicitly. This does not necessarily mean 
having an explicit target for financial markets. Such a target would be unworkable due both 
to the volatility of such markets and the problems inherent in defining financial stability, and it 
could be a distraction from the main task of stabilizing inflation. However, the lesson of the 
global financial crisis is that monetary authorities at the very least need to pay close attention 
to risk factors associated with asset prices, and to take a more active role in “leaning against 
the wind” in order to avoid the buildup of such financial stability risk (Filardo and Genberg 
2010). The costs of “cleaning up afterward” now appear to be too high to be acceptable. 
The adoption of a framework for macroprudential supervision and regulation can make an 
important contribution to securing greater macroeconomic and financial stability. The 
experience of the global financial crisis shows that financial stability cannot necessarily be 
adequately assessed by microprudential supervision alone, i.e., by examining the financial 
strength of individual institutions in isolation. The role of macroprudential supervision is to 
examine the interrelations of different market actors and financial markets, particularly in 
situations of economic stress. Moreover, it is critically important for the financial stability 
regulator to have adequate macroprudential tools to intervene in markets if it finds that risks 
to financial stability are developing (Kawai and Pomerleano 2010). Having such tools, 
including loan-to-value ratios, loan-to-income ratios and restrictions on bank leveraging, can 
provide alternatives to changes in the policy interest rate to influencing the financial sector. 
This can potentially ease policy conflicts when near-term inflation conditions imply a different 
policy stance than that suggested by more forward-looking asset price movements. 
Management of capital flows can be seen as one aspect of macroprudential management—
focusing on ways to reduce the volatility of capital flows to avoid “sudden stops” associated 
with large-scale capital outflows, as well as potential risks of inflation and asset bubble 
arising from overly exuberant short-term capital inflows. For countries whose capital 
accounts are already liberalized, capital flow management tools can include surcharges, 
time limits on inward foreign deposits, and incentives to lengthen the maturity of such 
investments. For countries whose capital accounts are not yet liberalized, including the PRC 
and India, they have considerably greater flexibility in managing capital flows. In that case, ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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the task is to balance the need for gradual  and phased capital account liberalization to 
improve capital allocation against the costs of excessive volatility of capital flows. 
Increased currency flexibility provides greater flexibility in managing external shocks as well. 
The increased flexibility of Asian currencies during the global financial crisis compared with 
during the Asian crisis was one factor that helped to contribute to an early rebound of Asian 
exports and growth. Of course, during the crisis this was downward currency flexibility. As 
capital inflows resume, it is important for currency authorities to put aside their “fear of 
floating” and allow upward flexibility of their currencies as well. This will help to reduce 
inflationary pressures, and will also tend to reduce the “one-way” bet inherent in managed 
currency regimes that tends to invites speculative capital inflows.  
Some argue that a rising currency may invite more capital inflows because of rising 
expectations of further currency appreciation. However, these dangers are easy to 
exaggerate. To the extent that under-valued currencies appreciate, they move closer to their 
“equilibrium” levels (using the term as loosely as possible), which implies that the scope for 
speculative gains has diminished. Also, as mentioned above, the monetary authorities need 
to have adequate macroprudential tools to limit capital inflows if they are perceived as a 
threat to financial stability. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes the contribution that macroeconomic policy can make to promote a 
rebalancing of growth away from dependence on exports to developed economies to a more 
sustainable pattern of growth centered on domestic and regional demand. This represents a 
significant departure from the traditional uses of macroeconomic policy to stabilize the 
economic cycle and achieve stable and low inflation. In comparison with these more 
traditional applications of macroeconomic policy, the literature on this subject is still quite 
scarce. However, the evidence suggests that there is significant scope for macroeconomic 
policy to exert an influence on the investment-savings balance. Moreover, policy measures 
not only can affect aggregate demand directly, but can also affect it indirectly via their 
“microeconomic” impacts on private sector behavior. These policies are summarized in 




Table 4: Channels for Macroeconomic Policy to Encourage Rebalancing 
   Policy 
Channels  Fiscal  Monetary 
Consumption       
 Lessen precautionary 
savings 
Expand social safety net  Improve macroeconomic 
and financial stability, 
including capital flow 
management 
 Increase income  Income transfers    
    From corporate sector    
    To low-income groups    
 Increase labor productivity  Increase education 
spending 
  
Investment       
 Public investment  Infrastructure investment    
 Private investment     Monetary easing; improve 
macroeconomic and 
financial stability, including 
capital flow management 




  Deepen SME finance  SME financing 
infrastructure—databases 
  




First, although in the long-term fiscal policy should be balanced to maintain government debt 
stability and avoid crowding out of private investment, there may be significant scope to 
expand monetary and fiscal policy in the medium-term support aggregate demand to offset 
the deflationary effects of an appreciating currency during a period of current account 
surplus reversal. If anything, the evidence suggests that the deflationary effects of such 
appreciation episodes have tended to be overestimated, leading to an overshoot of stimulus 
which then led to inflation and/or asset bubbles. This suggests that most of the needed 
stimulus can be provided by monetary policy, with only a supplementary role to be played by 
fiscal policy. Moreover, current account surplus countries have typically begun episodes of 
sustained currency appreciation with ample policy space.  
The evidence suggests that excessive savings rather than insufficient investment is the main 
factor behind high current account surpluses in Asian economies. This implies that 
measures to encourage consumption, either by raising the level of household disposable 
income or reducing the savings are likely to have the highest payoff in terms of reducing 
imbalances. Increased spending on social protection, including health insurance, 
unemployment insurance and pensions, as well as investment in education, are key ways to 
reduce household demand for precautionary savings. In countries such as the PRC, where 
the share of households in national income is abnormally low, income transfers from the 
corporate sector can also play a significant role in boosting income. More broadly, income 
transfer schemes can support consumption by shifting incomes to lower-income households 
that tend to have higher propensities to consume. Such transfer schemes, if properly 
implemented, can also reduce the volatility of income, also reducing the need for 
precautionary savings. ADBI Working Paper 266    Morgan 
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Governments can raise investment spending directly through increased government 
investment, especially infrastructure investment. Such investments can play an important 
facilitating role in expanding the effective size of regional markets by facilitating trade and 
investment. There also may be large payoffs to making investments to improve the 
investment climate, thereby encouraging private investment. This may be particularly 
effective in those countries hit hard by the Asian crisis that score relatively low in terms of 
investment climate, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. Cutting and 
simplifying corporate tax rates and payment procedures can also encourage investment. 
Government assistance to deepen financial markets can also contribute, including improving 
the infrastructure for corporate bond markets, developing credit databases and other 
infrastructure for SMEs, and developing the infrastructure for microfinance. Finally, 
dismantling of schemes to support exports, including foreign exchange intervention and 
export subsidies, can have direct positive impacts on the fiscal balance as well as promoting 
a reduction of net exports. 
Improvement of frameworks for macroeconomic and financial stability can also support 
domestic demand by reducing uncertainty. This includes  giving more explicit weight to 
financial stability as an objective of monetary policy, developing a macroprudential 
framework for financial surveillance and regulation, and refining policy tools for management 
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